Central to both the Cadbury Committee's initial remit and its subsequent recommendations is the view that director integrity and board effectiveness play key roles in ensuring the quality and reliability of published financial statements. Using a constant sample, this paper tests whether the association between board composition and earnings management activity differs between the pre-and post-Cadbury periods. These results are consistent with the view that appropriately structured boards are discharging their financial reporting duties more effectively post-Cadbury.
INTRODUCTION
Boards of directors are legally charged with monitoring management on behalf of shareholders. Traditionally, however, boards of large U.K. companies were considered relatively passive entities, often dominated by the very managers whom they were supposed to monitor. This raised concerns in some quarters about a possible lack of managerial accountability. The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) (hereinafter, Cadbury Report) focused attention on the board's monitoring responsibilities and highlighted the special contribution that non-executive directors (NEDs) can make to this process. Subsequent efforts by U.K. listed firms to comply with the recommendations contained in the Cadbury Report have increased the demand for NEDs Cadbury Compliance Report, 1995) . Equally important, the publicity and public debate generated by the Cadbury Report has clarified the monitoring responsibilities of NEDs, particularly with respect to financial reporting. Peasnell et al. (1999a) present evidence supporting the view that NEDs help to constrain accrual management to meet earnings targets post-Cadbury. This paper extends Peasnell et al.'s results by testing (a) whether a similar relation holds for the pre-Cadbury period and (b) whether the increased emphasis on managerial accountability in the post-Cadbury period is associated with a significant improvement in the extent to which NEDs currently discharge their financial reporting duties.
The Cadbury Committee was established in May 1991 by the Financial
Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession to review the aspects of corporate governance specifically related to financial reporting and accountability. A primary stimulus underlying its formation was the declining confidence in U.K. financial reporting resulting (in part) from a series of unexpected business failures and high profile financial scandals that occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The manipulation of accounting numbers was perceived to be widespread (Griffiths, 1986) . In response, the Committee issued a voluntary Code of Best Practice aimed at promoting higher standards of corporate behaviour. A central theme in the Cadbury Report is the link between internal governance procedures and the financial reporting process. Pivotal to the Code of Best Practice is the role of the board, and in particular its NED component, in helping to ensure the quality and integrity of accounting information.
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The new emphasis placed on the role of NEDs has not met with universal acclaim. In particular, some elements in the business community are dissatisfied with the increased emphasis on the board's monitoring duties and question the benefits (if any) associated with the "corporate watchdog" view of NEDs exceed the costs. To date, however, we are unaware of any empirical research that seeks to explore whether the level of monitoring by NEDs has changed significantly following the publication of the Cadbury Report. This paper seeks to make good this deficiency by examining the links between board composition and earnings management activity in the period spanning the Cadbury Report's issuance.
Measuring accounting manipulations is fraught with difficulty. We follow prior research by using abnormal working capital accruals to proxy for earnings management. Board composition is defined as the ratio of NEDs to total board size.
Results for the post-Cadbury period (1994) (1995) confirm those reported by Peasnell et al. (1999a) who show that when the proportion of NEDs is high, managers are less likely to make income-increasing accruals to avoid reporting earnings losses or earnings declines. In contrast, our results provide no evidence of an association between income-increasing abnormal accruals and the proportion of NEDs in the preCadbury period (1990) (1991) . Our evidence is consistent with the view that appropriately structured boards are discharging their financial reporting duties more effectively post-Cadbury.
It should be recognised, however, that these tests do not directly demonstrate that the structural break in the association between abnormal accruals and board composition was caused by the Cadbury Report's recommendations and the associated pressure for increased managerial accountability. Consequently, the second stage in our analysis involves examining two competing explanations for our findings. First, we test whether a change in the earnings management instrument resulting from the introduction of FRS3 is driving our findings -in particular, whether firms appear to have used extraordinary items to manage reported results before 1993 and discretionary accruals afterwards. Secondly, we test whether temporal variation in the stimulus for earnings management can explain our findings -that is to say, whether the assumed desire to meet earnings targets changed sufficiently over time to account for our results. We find that neither explanation can account for the observed structural break. These tests provide some assurance that our findings are not being driven by confounding events. Our results suggest that NEDs now play a more prominent role in constraining earnings management. However, it still remains an open question whether this can be directly attributed to the changes brought about by the Cadbury Report.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The following section discusses the role and evolution of the board of directors in the U.K. and develops the prediction of improved board monitoring in the post-Cadbury period. Section 3 presents details of our research design and sampling procedure, while section 4 reports evidence of a change in the relationship between earnings management and board composition over the period 1990-1995. Section 5 presents and tests two competing explanations for our findings. Conclusions appear in section 6.
MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Boards and Monitoring
Boards of directors perform the dual roles of decision ratification and decision monitoring (Fama and Jensen 1983, pp. 311) . To facilitate effective monitoring, boards include outside members who play no direct role in the management of the company. Proponents of the boards-as-monitors view believe that NEDs are central to the effective resolution of agency problems between managers and shareholders (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983, pp.311) . Until recently, however, the boards of large U.K.
companies were typically composed of senior managers selected from within the organisation. For example, over 20% of companies in the Times 1000 had no NEDs in 1982 (Bank of England, 1983) . As a result, the arms-length relationship implied in the board's monitoring role was severely compromised.
The Cadbury Report was published in December 1992 and contains a Code of Best Practice designed to serve as the benchmark against which good governance can be assessed. The Code recommends, inter alia, that all firms create an audit committee with at least three members and consisting exclusively of NEDs. While the Code does not explicitly specify a minimum number of non-executive board members, the recommendation relating to audit committees means that firms must have at least three NEDs in order to report full compliance. Through the recommendations contained in the Code of Best Practice, the Cadbury Report (1992) helped raise expectations concerning the governance role of the board of directors and enhanced the profile of NEDs in relation to the board's monitoring duties. More generally, the Report acted as a catalyst for a wider debate on managerial accountability and the importance of effective corporate governance.
The recommendations contained in the Cadbury Report do not have the force of law. Compliance with the Code is voluntary and as a result companies remain free to choose their own board composition. However, the London Stock Exchange adopted as part of its listing rules the requirement for all U.K.-incorporated listed firms to include a statement of compliance with the Code in their annual report and accounts for fiscal years ending on or after 30 June 1993.. In the event that a firm does not fully comply, details of (and reasons for) the non-compliance must be disclosed, thereby making non-compliance a potentially costly action.
The recommendations contained in the Cadbury Report, together with the increased concern with corporate governance matters more generally, have resulted in a substantial re-organisation of U.K. boards . For example, to ensure that the direction and control of the organisation is firmly in the hands of the board, most companies now have a formal schedule identifying matters reserved to the board for decision (Cadbury Compliance Statement 1995, pp.24) . As a result, many boards now operate in a different mode than they did a few short years ago and a view is emerging that U.K. boards have begun to take their monitoring responsibilities more seriously than was the case in the past.
2 However, opinion on the monitoring role of the board and the watchdog view of NEDs remains sharply divided. On the one hand, many shareholder groups and governance specialists view the monitoring role ascribed to NEDs in the Cadbury Report as one of its most significant contributions and believe that it has led to an improvement in the calibre and effectiveness of U.K. boards. 3 In contrast, others view the increased emphasis on NEDs for monitoring and control purposes as either irrelevant, excessively costly, or as a threat to board unity. 4 In addition, many critics maintain that NEDs perform little or no real monitoring role because they lack the necessary independence, time, expertise, and information to challenge management effectively (Gilson and Kraakman, 1991, pp.875; Patton and Baker, 1987, pp.11) . In the absence of a clear theoretical basis for distinguishing between these competing views, the monitoring role of NEDs and the impact of the Cadbury Report on this role are empirical issues on which this paper aims to provide some evidence.
Financial Reporting
The quality of financial reporting lay at the heart of the Cadbury Report. While company law holds boards responsible for the financial reporting process, the extent to which boards effectively discharged these responsibilities in the pre-Cadbury period was questionable (Cadbury Report, 1992) . As an indication of the relative low weight that many boards attached to financial reporting matters, only 38% of companies surveyed by the Bank of England in 1988 had established an audit committee (Bank of England, 1988) . In contrast, this figure had risen to almost 92% by 1995, the majority of which had written terms of reference outlining their membership, authority and duties (Cadbury Compliance Report, 1995) .
A central issue affecting the quality of financial statements is the extent to which managers manipulate reported earnings numbers (Cadbury Report, 1992, pp.14) . Earnings are widely used by shareholders in contracting with senior managers, both directly as a basis for awarding bonuses and indirectly as reference points for triggering the award of executive stock options. Therefore, adverse earnings outcomes can have unfavorable wealth consequences for senior management. Moreover, Weisbach (1988) provides evidence that senior management turnover is associated with poor reported performance. These factors create potentially strong incentives for managers to manipulate reported earnings for opportunistic reasons (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) .
The board's legal responsibility for the content and presentation of financial statements, coupled with the specialised monitoring role ascribed to non-executives, raises the expectation that the extent of earnings management activity will be negatively related to the presence of NEDs on the board. Of course, this assumes that NEDs (a) posses sufficient incentives to monitor the financial reporting process and (b) are capable of identifying cases of earnings management. Economic arguments exist that support the first assumption. For example, while NEDs face potentially significant costs from earnings management such as loss of reputation as effective monitors (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) , the benefits are expected to accrue primarily to executive directors in the form of increased current period compensation (Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995) and reduced likelihood of dismissal (Weisbach, 1988) . In the absence of any significant benefits accruing to NEDs from earnings management, the associated costs are predicted to provide them with powerful incentives to monitor the financial reporting process. As for the assumed ability of NEDs to identify cases of earnings management, several factors suggest that this condition will be met. First, Peasnell et al. (1999b) report that non-executives in the U.K. often have a professional accounting background. Second, NEDs frequently hold senior management positions in other large firms and as such are likely to be relatively familiar with financial reporting issues, even if they do not actually possess a formal accounting qualification. Finally, the firm's auditor has a role to play in identifying unusual or questionable accruals and bringing them to the attention of NEDs through communications with the board and the audit committee.
Consistent with NEDs possessing both the necessary incentives and ability to monitor the quality of published financial statements, Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996) find that U.S. firms subject to fraud allegations and SEC Enforcement
Actions are characterised by a lower proportion of non-executive board members.
Similarly, Peasnell et al. (1999a) present evidence of the predicted negative association between earnings management activity and the proportion of nonexecutive board members for a sample of U.K. firms in the post-Cadbury period. H1: Ceteris paribus, the negative association between income-increasing earnings management and the proportion of non-executive board members is more pronounced in the post-Cadbury period.
METHODOLOGY
Earnings Management
Earnings management instruments can be divided into two types: real operating decisions such as asset sales (Black et al., 1998; Bartov, 1993) and changes in R&D expenditure (Bushee, 1998; Bange and DeBondt, 1998) , and pure financial reporting decisions such as accounting method changes (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) and accrual choices (McNichols and Wilson, 1988) . Senior managers face costs associated with both types of instrument. The primary cost of using real operating decisions to manage earnings is that it can reduce shareholder value. The cost of accounting manipulations is that their effects must reverse sometime in the future. In other words, boosting earnings in one period must reduce subsequent earnings. We conjecture that since the costs of reversals are likely to be less than the costs of resorting to sub-optimal operating decisions to boost reported performance, managers will generally prefer to use pure financial reporting decisions to manage earnings (Peasnell, 1998) . This is particularly likely to apply in those situations where the goal is to temporarily boost reported profit. We therefore focus in this study on earnings management in the form of accounting manipulations.
We follow recent work on earnings management by measuring accounting manipulation using aggregate accounting accruals. Accruals summarise in a single measure the net effect of numerous recognition and measurement decisions, thereby capturing the portfolio nature of income determination (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, pp.138) . However, unlike most prior studies that use total accruals, defined as working capital accruals plus depreciation, we focus solely on the working capital element.
Using working capital accruals to measure earnings management is potentially more appealing than using total accruals for several reasons. First, Young (1999) demonstrates that the modified-Jones model induces systematic measurement error in the resulting abnormal accruals estimate when accruals are measured inclusive of depreciation. Secondly, there are strong reasons to believe that working capital manipulations will be more opaque than non-current account manipulations. Working capital accruals include such judgmental items as provisions for doubtful debts, warranties and inventory obsolescence which prior research has shown are used to manage earnings (e.g., McNichols and Wilson, 1988) . In contrast, it is claimed that depreciation has more limited potential as an additional earnings management instrument because of its visibility and rigidity (Young, 1999, pp.11; Beneish, 1998, pp.5). 6 Working capital accruals management is not directly observable. We therefore use the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) to generate estimates of accrual management. However, evidence suggests this model identifies discretionary accruals imprecisely due to the confounding effects of factors unrelated to earnings management in the period (Guay et al. 1996; Healy 1996; Dechow et al. 1995) .
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Therefore, we follow Healy (1996, pp.114) and label estimated non-discretionary accruals as "normal accruals" and estimated discretionary accruals as "abnormal accruals". Abnormal accruals are ambiguous in the sense that they measure earnings management with error. Our research design (discussed below) addresses the ambiguity in abnormal accruals by conditioning the empirical analysis on the incentives to manage earnings. When incentives are particularly strong, we can be more confident that abnormal accruals reflect earnings management activity.
Consistent with recent U.S. studies (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998) , we use a cross-sectional procedure to estimate parameters for the modified-Jones model. Notwithstanding differences between U.K. and U.S.
GAAP, Peasnell et al. (1999c) show that the cross-sectional version of the modifiedJones model is capable of capturing relatively subtle instances of accrual management in U.K. data. A cross-sectional approach helps to maximize sample size and overcomes the survivorship bias problem inherent in the time-series version of the Jones (1991) model. 8 A cost of the cross-sectional approach, however, is that it ignores possible reversals of abnormal accruals from prior periods, thereby reducing the power of empirical tests to detect earnings management.
The modified-Jones model parameters are estimated using the following crosssectional OLS regression:
where WC i is working capital accruals for firm i, defined as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities, ∆REV i is the change in revenue, 
where 0 ω and 1 ω are the OLS regression estimates of ω 0 and ω 1 obtained from equation (1) and ∆REC i is the change in receivables.
Research Design
In view of the potential ambiguity in estimated abnormal accruals, we test for the association between earnings management and board effectiveness by focusing on a situation in which the incentive for income-increasing earnings management is expected to be particularly strong. We begin by defining unmanaged earnings (UME)
as reported earnings (EARN t ) minus abnormal accruals (AA t ). We expect the incentives for income-increasing earnings management to be particularly strong when UME falls below target earnings. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) examine two earnings targets. Specifically, they suggest that managers will seek to avoid reporting losses (EARN t < 0) and earnings declines (EARN t < EARN t-1 ). Another possible target is meeting analysts' earnings forecasts. Degeorge et al. (1999) find that while managers appear to manipulate reported earnings upwards to meet analysts' forecasts, earnings management to avoid losses and earnings declines proves predominant. We therefore follow Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and use the avoidance of losses and earnings declines as the targets for this study. Our predictions are that incomeincreasing accruals will be more likely when UME < 0 and when UME < EARN t-1 .
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Our research design is intended to test whether NEDs constrain earnings management to meet earnings targets and whether the constraint is more pronounced following the publication of the Cadbury Report than it was beforehand. In the following tests, we define NEDs as board members classified as "non-executive" in the annual reports of our sample companies. 11 We estimate the following OLS regression model: We partition sample observations according to whether UME exceeds or falls short of the targets specified above and estimate equation (3) separately for each subset. If earnings management is taking place and our prediction about the role of
NEDs is correct, then we would expect the estimated coefficient on OUT to be negative and significant. Moreover, if hypothesis one is correct and NEDs are performing their monitoring duties more effectively in the post-Cadbury period, then the estimated coefficient on OUT for the post-Cadbury regime (λ 1 ) should be more negative than that for the pre-Cadbury regime (λ 1 + γ 1 ) when UME is below-target. In other words, we expect λ 1 to be negative and significant and γ 1 to be positive and significant when regression (3) is estimated for the below-target sub-samples.
Conversely, we have no predictions for the coefficients on OUT and OUT·CAD when regression (3) is estimated for the sub-samples where UME is above-target, since systematic income-increasing accrual management is not predicted to occur in these circumstances.
Prior research suggests that accrual management may be related to the level of insider ownership (Warfield et al. 1995) , external ownership structure (Rajgopal et al., 1999 ), auditor quality (Becker et al. 1998) , the probability of debt covenant violation (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) , political costs (Han and Wang, 1998), smoothing (DeFond and Park, 1997), and operating cash flow performance (Dechow et al., 1995) .
We therefore include proxies for these potential determinants of abnormal accruals as additional control variables in regression (3). We also control for board size in our empirical tests given (a) the well-documented positive association between board size and the proportion of NEDs and (b) the suggestion that board effectiveness may be negatively related to board size (Yermack, 1996) . Variable definitions, together with their expected relation with AA, are presented in table 1. Consistent with our predictions for board composition, the predicted signs for the ownership structure, auditor quality and board size variables relate only to those instances where the incentive for earnings management is high (i.e., when UME < target). The predictions for the remaining variables apply to both above-and below-target samples.
Sample and Data
The relation between board composition and abnormal accruals is examined using a sample of U.K.-incorporated quoted companies for a period spanning the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) . We begin by defining two sub-periods that . 12 We use a balanced sample design to assess whether the association between abnormal accruals and board composition differs between the pre-and post-Cadbury periods. A balanced design allows each sample firm to serve as its own control, thereby eliminating any differences that might result from temporal variation in sample composition. Firms must therefore have at least one observation in both the pre-and post-Cadbury periods to be included in the final sample.
The modified-Jones model is estimated for each industry and year combination using all firms on the Datastream Active and Research files with available accruals data. 13 The number of firms used to estimate the model in 1990 (1991, 1994 and 1995 The intersection of the samples for which we have data for abnormal accruals, 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Over the 126 industry-year combinations for which the modified-Jones model is estimated, the mean (median) R-squared statistic is 18% (11%). The mean value of the coefficient on ∆REV (ω 1 ) in the modified-Jones model is 0.015 which is insignificantly different from zero (p = 0.170). In the pre-Cadbury sample, 93 firms (15%) are classified as below target when UME is benchmarked against zero, while 330 firms (52%) are classified as below target when UME is benchmarked against Leverage (LEV) also appears to have declined during the sample period, although the difference is not significant at conventional levels.
Our empirical tests of the link between board effectiveness and earnings management are based on a prediction of income-increasing accruals when UME falls short of target earnings. Table 3 reports mean and median abnormal accruals for the above-and below-target sub-samples and provides evidence consistent with this prediction. Panel A presents results for UME benchmarked against zero while panel B
reports findings for UME benchmarked against EARN t-1 . Reported earnings are defined as earnings before extraordinary items (Datastream item #182) plus preference dividends. 17 Mean and median abnormal accruals in the below-target subsamples (UME < 0 and UME < EARN t-1 ) are positive and significant in panels A and B for both the pre-and post-Cadbury samples. These findings support the prediction that working capital accruals are being managed upwards in both periods as a means of achieving target earnings. In contrast, average abnormal accruals in the above-target samples (UME ≥ 0 and UME ≥ EARN t-1 ) are negative, indicating no systematic propensity for income-increasing accounting choices in either period when UME exceeds target earnings.
The earnings management predictions are ambiguous for those firms where UME undershoots target earnings by a large amount. On the one hand, management concerns over costly sanctions in the form of additional monitoring (DeAngelo et al., 1994 ) and the increased likelihood of dismissal (Weisbach, 1988) suggest a preference for income-increasing choices. On the other hand, the big bath hypothesis predicts income-decreasing abnormal accruals as managers seek to store up positive earnings for future periods (Degeorge et al., 1999; Healy, 1985) . Big bath earnings management would potentially confound our empirical tests of hypothesis one because it is based on a prediction of income-increasing abnormal accruals when UME is below target. To assess whether income-increasing earnings management is apparent across the full range of UME in the below-target subsets, table 3 also reports mean and median abnormal accruals partitioned by the extent to which UME (standardized by lagged total assets) undershoots target earnings. 18 The partition labeled "Small" contains firm-years where UME just misses the target, while that labeled "Large"
contains firm-years where the shortfall is greatest. All else equal, the big bath hypothesis predicts negative abnormal accruals in "Large". In contrast, estimated abnormal accruals in the "Large" partition are positive and significant at the 0.01 for both the pre-and post-Cadbury periods. Abnormal accruals are also positive and significant in the remaining four partitions. These results hold regardless of whether we define the earnings target as zero (panel A) or last period's reported earnings (panel B). The findings suggest that pooling the observations in the below-target subsamples is justified since they appear to be relatively homogenous with respect to the direction of abnormal accrual activity. is close to zero in the pre-Cadbury period. While we offer no formal explanation for the temporal shifts in relation to AUD and BRDOWN, the significant differences documented in table 2 for these variables across the sample period coupled with the general governance changes occurring during the period mean that it is perhaps not surprising that we also observe structural breaks for these mechanisms. Of the remaining control variables, only the operating cash flow variable is significant at conventional levels.
Regression Results
Tests of whether
Consistent with the lack of any systematic attempts to artificially boost reported earnings when UME exceed target earnings, results in panel A provide no evidence of a link between abnormal accruals and board composition in either subperiod for the above-target sub-sample (columns 6-8). Similarly, there is little evidence that any of the additional governance variables are systematically associated with earnings management activity when UME exceed target earnings. The estimated coefficients on SIZE, REL and CFO display their predicted signs and are significant at conventional levels. The negative coefficient on LEV has the opposite sign to that predicted but is not significant. (3) is estimated using the above target sub-sample (columns 6-8).
In an attempt to further understand the changing nature of the association between abnormal accruals and board composition during the sample period, we examine the role of audit committees in the financial reporting process. Boards of directors often delegate responsibility for oversight of the financial reporting process to an audit committee staffed by NEDs. Audit committees are widely viewed as enhancing the board's capacity to discharge its financial reporting duties effectively (Cadbury Report, 1992; Klein, 1998) . This raises the possibility that the increased use of such committees documented by the Cadbury Compliance Report (1995) during our sample period may underlie the structural break in the association between abnormal accruals and NEDs documented above. 20 We examine this issue by re-estimating regression (3) for the subset of sample firms with an audit committee in both the preand post-Cadbury periods. 21 From the initial sample, we were able to unambiguously identify 139 firms (39%) that had an audit committee in both sub-periods. If the increasing use of audit committees is the primary factor driving changes in the association between abnormal accruals and board composition during the sample period, then we would not expect to find evidence of the structural break among firms that had an operational audit committee throughout the sample period. In contrast, results provide evidence of a similar structural break for the audit committee sample to that reported for the full sample. As such, these findings do not support the view that the documented structural break in the association between abnormal accruals and NEDs is primarily due to the increasing use of audit committees among sample firms in the post-Cadbury period.
To summarise, the findings presented in table 4 are consistent with the hypothesis that boards, and NEDs in particular, are discharging their financial reporting responsibilities more effectively in the post-Cadbury period. 22 Moreover, the lack of any significant association between abnormal accruals and board composition in the pre-Cadbury period is consistent with the unfettered use of creative accounting practices that motivated the formation of the Cadbury Committee in the first place.
However, while these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the Cadbury Report (1992) helped raise the level of board monitoring, our empirical tests do not directly demonstrate that the observed structural break in the relation between abnormal accruals and board composition is a consequence of the changes brought about by the Cadbury Report and the associated governance debate. In the next section, therefore, we extend our analysis to consider two alternative explanations that may be driving our results.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
The FRS3 Hypothesis
Pope and Walker (1999) and Beattie et al. (1994) provide evidence that prior to the introduction of FRS 3, U.K. companies used the flexibility inherent in the classification of extraordinary items to manage reported earnings. The introduction of FRS 3 in July 1993 effectively outlawed the use of extraordinary items for financial reporting purposes and in so doing eliminated a potentially important earnings management tool. In the context of the present study, FRS 3 limits the use of extraordinary items to our pre-Cadbury sub-period only. Recall that our basic results focus on earnings before extraordinary items (Datastream item #182). If, prior to FRS 3, firms were using extraordinary items to manipulate reported earnings, then proxying for earnings management using accrual-based measures will generate lower power tests in the pre-Cadbury period, relative to the post-Cadbury period. This raises the possibility that our inability to document an association between earnings management and board composition in the pre-Cadbury period may be due to our failure to use the appropriate earnings management instrument, rather than because of any improvement in board monitoring resulting from the Cadbury Report.
To test this alternative explanation, we collect data on extraordinary items (XI)
reported by firms in the pre-Cadbury sample. From the initial sample of 630 firm-year observations, data are available for 617 firm-years (98%) from Datastream. We begin by testing to see whether firms in the pre-Cadbury period were using XIs as a means of achieving target earnings when unmanaged earnings undershoot the target. For the purpose of the following tests, we construct a new measure of unmanaged earnings (UMEXI) defined as reported earnings after extraordinary items, plus preference dividends. We define a negative (positive) XI as income-increasing (decreasing).
Descriptive statistics for XIs are presented in Pope and Walker (1999) and confirm prior suggestions (e.g., Smith, 1992) Having established that XIs appear to have been used by companies in the preCadbury period to manipulate reported earnings, we test whether NEDs constrained the use of XIs among below-target firms in the same way that they appear to constrain abnormal accruals post-Cadbury. 
Temporal Variation in the Stimulus for Earnings Management
While managers may face strong incentives to exercise their financial reporting discretion in all accounting periods, the underlying rationale may vary across time. We conjecture that the dominant stimulus for accrual management will depend on the specific circumstances facing the firm which will be governed, at least in part, by the general economic climate. Temporal shifts in general economic performance, therefore, are expected to lead to variation in the stimulus for earnings management.
The sample period examined in this study spans two contrasting periods of general economic performance: the pre-Cadbury window (1990) (1991) is associated with a recessionary period, while the post-Cadbury period (1994) (1995) is associated with higher growth and improved economic performance. Therefore, if differences in underlying economic performance affect either the propensity or stimulus for earnings management (or both), our failure to observe a systematic association between abnormal accruals and board composition in the pre-Cadbury period may simply reflect a failure to consider the appropriate earnings management stimulus. More specifically, the desire to manage earnings upwards to meet pre-determined earnings targets in the pre-Cadbury period may have been dominated by other concerns.
Prior research provides evidence that managers select income-increasing accounting methods as a means of avoiding costly debt covenant violation (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) . From table 2 we note that leverage is higher in the preCadbury period. To the extent that leverage proxies for the likelihood of debt contract violation (Press and Weintrop, 1990) , it is possible that earnings management activity in the pre-Cadbury period was directed more towards avoiding or delaying technical breaches of accounting-based debt contracts, rather than at attaining specific earnings targets. If this was indeed the case, then the constraining effect of NEDs is more likely to have been evident for high leverage firms, rather than for firms with UME less than target earnings.
25
We test this prediction by assigning pre-Cadbury firm-year observations to quintile portfolios formed on the basis of leverage. Using these quintile portfolios, we construct a "high leverage" partition consisting of all firm-years in the top two quintiles of the leverage distribution. If NEDs constrain accrual-based earnings management activity aimed at deferring or avoiding the costs of debt contract violations, then we would expect to observe a negative association between AA and %NED for the high leverage partition. For comparative purposes, we also examine the association between abnormal accruals and %NED for a "low leverage" partition consisting of all firm-years in the bottom two quintiles of the leverage distribution.
Since we do not expect these firms to systematically manage earnings upwards, no association between AA and %NED is predicted for this partition. Results are presented in table 7. While the estimated coefficient on %NED in the high leverage partition is negative as predicted, it is not significant at conventional levels. As such, these results provide no evidence to support the view that changes in the stimulus for earnings management over our sample period are responsible for the structural break in the association between abnormal accruals and board composition reported in section 4.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the association between the composition of the board of directors and accrual management activity in two contrasting governance regimes in the U.K.. Using a balanced sample, it extends the work of Peasnell et al. (1999a) by examining whether the constraining effect of non-executive directors on incomeincreasing accruals management differs between the pre-and post-Cadbury periods.
Results provide evidence of accrual management to meet earnings targets in both the pre-and post-Cadbury periods. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these results suggest that the recent changes in the U.K. governance system have failed to completely eliminate earnings management activity. Regarding the specific link between earnings management and board composition, results for the post-Cadbury period indicate less income-increasing accrual management to avoid earnings losses or earnings declines when the proportion of non-executive directors is high. In contrast, we find no evidence of an association between the degree of accrual management and the proportion of non-executive directors in the pre-Cadbury period. Additional tests indicate that the increasing use of audit committees during the sample period does not appear capable of explaining the observed structural break in the association between abnormal accruals and board composition.
Our results contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we show that, given appropriate conditions, NEDs can help to constrain earnings management and hence increase the quality of financial reports. These results confirm those reported by Peasnell et al. (1999a) and support the view that the board's effectiveness at monitoring management is a positive function of the proportion of non-executive members. Secondly, our results suggest that appropriately structured boards are discharging their financial reporting duties more effectively following the issuance of the Cadbury Report. As such, these findings are consistent with the view that the publication of the Cadbury Report has had a material impact on the way in which U.K.
boards operate.
A significant limitation of this study is our inability to provide evidence of a direct causal relationship between the publication of the Cadbury Report and the structural break documented between abnormal accruals and board composition. As a result, we are unable to reject the possibility that this structural break may be due to one or more factors unrelated to the Cadbury Report. To address this issue, we consider two competing explanations for our findings. First we test for evidence of a change in the earnings management instrument as a result of the introduction of FRS 3. Secondly, we test whether temporal variation in the stimulus for earnings management can explain our findings. Results suggest that neither explanation can account for the changing nature of the association between abnormal accruals and board composition over the sample period. However, while these findings help to eliminate two possible explanations for our results, the possibility remains that our findings are capturing something other than the impact of the Cadbury Report.
End Notes 1 The Cadbury Report also highlights the importance of the statutory audit as a control mechanism in the financial reporting process.
2 A similar move towards board empowerment has been documented in the U.S. by Millstein and MacAvoy (1998) and Lorsch (1995) .
3 See for example, "Cadbury successor may change board reforms" (Financial Times, 1995) , "The old boy network is put out to grass" (Times, 1994) , and the report by the Institutional Shareholders Committee (1991) on the role and duties of directors. 4 For example, "Listed directors against increased Cadbury Code requirements" (The Independent, 1996) , "Call to replace Cadbury and Greenbury Codes" (The Independent, 1996) , "Chewing over Cadbury" (Times, 1994) , and 'New image: old message' (Times, 1994) . 5 These studies assume that in the absence of a reliable means of distinguishing between the competing incentives for earnings management (i.e., opportunism, efficient contracting, or signalling), NEDs attempt to constrain the subset of accounting choices that most likely reflect managerial opportunism. Prior research generally associates opportunistic behavior by managers with income-increasing accounting choices (Holthausen 1990; Watts and Zimmerman 1986) . Consequently, these studies test for a negative association between income-increasing earnings management and the presence of NEDs. 6 We re-ran the tests reported in this paper using total accruals in place of working capital accruals, with almost identical results. 7 Confounding factors include exogenous shocks to firm performance, strategic operating decisions, and the reversal of prior-period discretionary accruals. 8 The procedure has the additional advantage over the time-series approach that it does not require the assumption that parameter estimates remain stable over time. 9 In the original specification of the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) , adjusting the ∆REV term for the change in receivables (∆REC) is done after equation (1) has been fitted. In other words, for estimation purposes the Jones and modified-Jones models are equivalent.
Recently, however, researchers have begun to estimate cross-sectional versions of the modified-Jones model in which ∆REV is adjusted by ∆REC at the estimation stage (e.g., Rajgopal et al. 1999) . We repeated our empirical tests using this alternative specification of the modified-Jones model. In all cases, the findings were consistent with those based on equation (1). 10 It should be noted that below-target UME might not necessarily lead managers to prefer income-increasing earnings management. In particular, it may be either infeasible or prohibitively costly to manage earnings upwards to meet the target when UME falls far short.
In these circumstances, managers may even prefer to adopt a "big bath" strategy and make income-decreasing accruals, effectively storing up income-increasing earnings management options for future periods (Degeorge et al. 1999; Healy 1985) . Whether this actually happens is an empirical issue that we address in section 4.
11 Our definition of a NED makes no distinction between non-executives without business or financial links to management (independent NEDs) and non-executives with such links (so called "greys"). Limitations in company disclosures prior to Cadbury preclude any attempt to develop a reliable measure of independence that can be used consistently across both the preand post-Cadbury periods. All else equal, the inclusion of greys is likely to reduce the power of our tests. As a check on the robustness of the results for the post-Cadbury period, we report in the results section a supplementary test where NEDs are restricted to those with no affiliations to management. 12 We exclude the period June 1992 to December 1992 from the pre-Cadbury period in an effort to reduce contamination of our results by firms that changed their board structure in response to the Cadbury Committee's draft report published in May 1992. We exclude the period December 1992 to May 1994 from the post-Cadbury period because this represented a transition period during which time companies were responding to the recommendations contained in the Committee's final report. 13 The sample of firm-years used to test hypothesis one is a subset of the firm-year observations used to estimate regression (1).
14 The Corporate Register is published quarterly by Hemmington Scott Ltd. and includes data for all firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. Hemmington Scott up-date their database using information from the London Stock Exchange and Reuters. The publication lag for the register is approximately one month. We use the September edition of the Corporate Register in calendar year t to identify board composition for firms with year-ends between March of year t and February of year t+1. 15 Sample firms are fairly evenly distributed across industry groups. The largest industry represented in the final sample is general engineering with 135 firm-year observations (10.7%). None of the remaining industries account for more than 6% of the final sample. 16 As a check on the robustness of our results to the use of a balanced sample design, we repeated all tests using an unbalanced design in which regression (3) was estimated using all 1683 firm-year observations with available data. Findings provided even stronger evidence of a structural break than those reported for the balanced sample. However, it should not be forgotten that the sample firms change in the unbalanced design and so we cannot rule out the possibility that firm-specific factors might be driving the result.
have an incremental effect on earnings management beyond that of board composition. 21 In addition, we also regressed abnormal accruals for the below-target samples on both %NED and a binary variable (AC) indicating the presence of an audit committee, using data for the post-Cadbury period. While the estimated coefficient on %NED was consistent with that reported in table 4, the coefficient on AC never attained significance at conventional levels. Moreover, the coefficient on AC remained insignificant even after %NED was excluded from the regression. These findings suggest that the negative association between abnormal accruals and %NED reported in the paper is not the result of an omitted variables problem caused by a failure to include an audit committee variable in the empirical model. 22 To assess the robustness of our post-Cadbury results to the definition of NEDs, we regressed abnormal accruals on a measure of independent NEDs, plus the vector of control variables, for the below-target samples. We classified as grey all NEDs whose board tenure exceeds ten years, who are related to management, or who are ex-managers, consultants, lawyers, financial advisors, or who are involved in a reciprocal interlock. All remaining NEDs were defined as independent. Results based on this measure of independent NEDs provided even stronger evidence of the predicted negative association between earnings management and board composition than those reported using %NED. These results suggest that the significant link between abnormal accruals and the proportion of NEDs documented in the post-Cadbury period is robust to the specific definition of NEDs.
23 Consistent with our prior tests, we have no predictions regarding the association between XI and OUT when the regression is estimated for the above-target samples, since systematic income-increasing accrual management is not predicted to occur in these circumstances. 24 In addition to the OLS regressions, we also estimated binary and multinomial logit models relating the probability of a firm reporting an extraordinary item to the proportion of NEDs.
Without exception, the estimated coefficient on %NED never attained significance at the 10% level or better. 
